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Say on Purpose: Lessons from Chinese Corporate Charters 
Li-Wen Lin* 
Final Version Forthcoming in Journal of Corporate Law Studies 
Abstract 
What is the purpose of the corporation? The debate has continued for a long time without a clear 
answer partly because corporate law is often silent or ambiguous on the purpose of the 
corporation. The debate is largely academic and has limited dialogues with corporations that 
manage business in the real world. If corporations themselves articulate the purpose in their 
constitutive documents, it might be helpful to resolve the corporate purpose controversy. China 
offers a valuable empirical setting to examine how corporations formally state the purpose in 
their corporate charters. The empirical findings in this article show that the purpose clause in the 
articles of incorporation is not static but evolving with institutional and organizational demands. 
However, the purpose clause serves only a signaling or marketing function because of external 
and intrinsic constraints.  
* Lin is an assistant professor at the University of British Columbia Peter A. Allard School of Law. Email:
lin@allard.ubc.ca. Phone: 1+ 604-822-2870. Address: 1822 E. Mall, Vancouver, British Columbia, Canada. This author thanks to 
Curtis Milhaupt, Carol Liao, Camden Hutchison and participants at the second annual Academic-Practitioner Roundtable on 
Responsible Business and the Law at the UBC Sauder Business School. 
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1. Introduction 
What is the purpose of the corporation? Is it to maximize shareholder wealth or to 
achieve some other set of social, political, or economic goals? This question has been the focus 
of a major scholarly debate that has continued for a long time without a definite answer.1 An 
important legal reason for the corporate purpose debate is that sources of corporate law are often 
silent or vague about the normative objective of the corporation. Corporate statutes often do not 
articulate the normative objective of the company.2 Available judicial opinions may be 
conflicting or unclear, which results in divergent interpretations.3 Moreover, corporate 
constitutions (including corporate charters and bylaws) as internal governance law usually do not 
stipulate the normative purpose of the company.4 To date, scholars in the corporate purpose 
debate have focused on interpreting corporate statutes and court decisions while having paid 
little attention to corporate constitutions. Corporate constitutions are a useful source to reflect 
                                                          
1 Existing legal scholarship often traces the origin of the corporate purpose debate to two articles published 
in the Harvard Law Review in the early 1930s. Adolf A. Berle, ‘Corporate Powers as Powers in Trust’ (1931) 44 
Harvard Law Review 1049; E. Merrick Dodd, ‘For Whom Are Corporate Managers Trustees’ (1932) 45 Harvard 
Law Review 1145. 
2 For instance, most corporate statutes in the United States simply provide that the purpose is to ‘engage in 
any lawful act or activity’. Delaware General Corporation Law Section 101(b) provides that ‘A corporation may be 
incorporated or organized under this chapter to conduct or promote any lawful business or purposes, except as may 
otherwise be provided by the Constitution or other law of this State’. In Canada, the Canada Business Corporations 
Act makes no express reference to the objective of the corporation.  
3 In the United States, scholars have different views on whether corporate law requires directors to 
maximize shareholder wealth. For the view that the law requires shareholder wealth maximization, George A. 
Mocsary, ‘Freedom of Corporate Purpose’ (2017) 2016 Brigham Young University Law Review 1319; Stephen M. 
Bainbridge, ‘In Defense of the Shareholder Wealth Maximization Norm’ (1993) 50 Washington & Lee Law Review 
1423. For the view that the law does not require shareholder wealth maximization, Lynn A. Stout, ‘Why We Should 
Stop Teaching Dodge v. Ford’ (2008) 3 Virginia Law & Business Review 163; Gordon Smith, ‘The Shareholder 
Primacy Norm’ (1998) 23 Journal of Corporation Law 277; Lyman Johnson and David Millon, ‘Corporate Law after 
Hobby Lobby’ (2014/2015) 70 The Business Lawyer 1. In Canada, the recent landmark case with regard to the 
purpose of the corporation is BCE Inc. v. 1976 Debentureholders (2008 SCC 69). Canadian legal practitioners split 
on interpretations of the case. Carol Liao, ‘A Canadian Model of Corporate Governance’ (2014) 37 Dalhousie Law 
Journal 559.  
4 Lynn A. Stout, The Shareholder Value Myth: How Putting Shareholders First Harms Investors, 
Corporations, and the Public (Berrett-Koehler 2012) 28 (noting that ‘the overwhelming majority of corporate 
charters simply state that the corporation’s purpose is to do anything lawful’). Andrew Keay, ‘Shareholder Primacy 
in Corporate Law: Can It Survive? Should It Survive?’ (2010) 7 European Company and Financial Law Review 369 
(observing that corporate charters in UK, US, Australia and elsewhere rarely provide expressly that the purpose of 
the corporation is to maximize shareholder wealth).   
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how corporations themselves say about their own purposes. They offer a bottom-up perspective 
to see the corporate objective, as opposed to the top-down view given by legislation or judicial 
decisions. The bottom-up view has practical importance given that corporations are the entities 
that carry out the purpose on a daily basis.  With the bottom-up approach in mind, some scholars 
have turned to alternative sources such as corporate websites, employee interviews and annual 
reports to empirically discover how corporations themselves state their objectives.5 While 
insightful, this approach is subject to important limitations. Corporate purposes identified 
through such information sources are usually non-legally-binding, non-official, and influenced 
by researchers’ subjective interpretations.  
From a legal perspective, it would be helpful if a company’s constitutive documents such 
as corporate charters include an express statement of the normative purpose of the company. 
Unfortunately, most jurisdictions in the world do not require such a normative statement in 
corporate charters. Hypothetically, if companies were required to make a firm-specific purpose 
statement in their corporate charters, what would they say? China offers a unique empirical 
setting to answer this hypothetical question. In China, listed companies always include a firm-
specific purpose clause in the articles of incorporation. Their purpose statements are not a 
boilerplate that ‘the purpose of the corporation is to engage in any lawful act or activity’ as seen 
                                                          
5 Malcolm Anderson et al., ‘Shareholder Primacy and Directors’ Duties: An Australian Perspective’ (2008) 
8 Journal of Corporate Law Studies 161 (surveying Australian directors’ views on shareholder primacy); Reegan 
Grayson Morison and Ian Ramsay, ‘An Analysis of Companies’ Business Objectives’ (2014) 32 Company and 
Securities Law Journal 438 (empirically identifying corporate purposes of top 100 companies listed on the 
Australian Securities Exchange by screening information from annual reports and information posted on corporate 
websites); Claudine Gartenberg, ‘Corporate Purpose and Financial Performance’ Organization Science 
(forthcoming) (measuring corporate purpose with survey data on employees’ perception); Luigi Guiso et al., ‘The 
Value of Corporate Culture’ (2015) 117 Journal of Financial Economics 60 (relying on information posted on 
corporate websites to analyze corporate culture of S&P 500 companies); PWC, ‘19th Annual Global CEO Survey / 
January 2016: Redefinding Business Success in a Changing World’ (surveying 1982 CEOs globally and asking 
questions including ‘In your own words, what is the purpose of your organization today?’), < 
https://www.pwc.com/gx/en/ceo-survey/2016/landing-page/pwc-19th-annual-global-ceo-survey.pdf> accessed 4 
November, 2018. 
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in Delaware and many other jurisdictions. Instead, each Chinese listed company devises its own 
purpose statement. Some interesting major findings emerge from the analysis of their corporate 
purpose clauses. First, the pursuit of shareholder value usually is not the single exclusive goal of 
the corporation. While companies regard shareholders as an important stakeholder group, they 
also often emphasize the importance of other stakeholders including society, consumers, 
employees, etc. Second, the prevailing purpose is not static but evolving. Companies follow 
trends in constructing the purpose statement. Third, legal, economic and political institutions 
shape the corporate purpose. China’s corporate law and state capitalism leave salient marks on 
the purpose statement. Fourth, the function of the corporate purpose clause in the charter is more 
a signaling or branding device than a reflection of what the company actually does. Contrary to a 
popular belief that shareholder primacy is good for financial performance, companies that 
disregard shareholders in the purpose clause have better financial performance than those that 
acknowledge shareholders. Poor performing firms may have more incentives in highlighting the 
importance of shareholders in the purpose clause to signal their commitment to shareholder value 
while better performing firms may have more leeway to focus beyond shareholder value. 
Meanwhile, there is little evidence that emphasizing non-shareholder stakeholders in the purpose 
clause is associated with better corporate social responsibility performance.       
  The empirical investigation of the purpose clause in the articles of incorporation 
provides a practical lens to revisit the corporate purpose debate. The prolonged purpose debate 
has been largely driven by scholars’ normative expectations and with limited formal voice from 
corporations themselves, those who have actual control over the construction of purpose. The 
pragmatic language used in the corporate purpose provision is rather different from the standard 
terms in the scholarly debate. The purposes envisioned by scholars tend to be idealistic while the 
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purposes professed by companies are strategic in response to organizational and institutional 
demands. Moreover, the variety of corporate purposes in corporate charters appears to present 
contractual freedom as a promising solution to the purpose controversy. However, the 
contractual nature of the purpose statement is far from self-contained and self-enforcing. The 
effectiveness of this contractual approach faces institutional constraints and intrinsic problems. 
As a result, the corporate purpose, at least stated in the articles of incorporation, has limited 
importance in legal practice.   
 This article proceeds as follows. Section 2 gives a brief overview of China’s relevant 
regulations on corporate purpose. Section 3 provides a hypothetical exercise of possible features 
of purpose clauses from a contractual perspective in the Chinese institutional context.  Section 4 
conducts an empirical analysis of the purpose clauses in Chinese listed companies’ articles of 
incorporation. Section 5 evaluates the theoretical and practical implications of the empirical 
findings.  
 
2. The Corporate Purpose Regulations in China 
 Similar to corporate statutes in other jurisdictions, China’s corporate law does not include 
an express statement of corporate purpose. Nevertheless, its corporate statute indicates that profit 
maximization is not the single exclusive goal of the corporation. China’s 1994 Company Act, the 
first national corporate statute since 1949, included a broad provision that ‘Companies shall 
comply with the law, conform to business ethics, strengthen the construction of socialist 
civilization, and subject themselves to the government and public supervision in the course of 
doing business.’6 In 2004, China made a comprehensive revision to its corporate statute. The 
                                                          
6 Chinese Company Act (1994), art. 14.  
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reform efforts culminated in the 2006 Company Act. The new corporate law explicitly refers to 
the term of corporate social responsibility (CSR). Article 5 of the statute provides that ‘In the 
course of doing business, a company shall comply with laws and administrative regulations, 
conform to social morality and business ethics, act in good faith, subject itself to the government 
and the public supervision, and undertake social responsibility.’ Chinese scholars are debating 
the nature of Article 5. Some scholars take the view that Article 5 is simply a moral call given 
the great vagueness in the statutory language and no enforcement mechanisms for non-
compliance.7 Other scholars see Article 5 is mandatory given that it is a fundamental legal 
principle and it should be applied to interpretations of all provisions throughout the corporate 
statute.8 A minimum consensus is that corporate decisions that consider CSR are obviously 
permitted and encouraged rather than prohibited.    
 For Chinese listed companies, the corporate purpose is governed by not only the 
corporate statute but also China Securities and Regulatory Commission (CSRC)’s regulations. 
CSRC promulgated the Guidelines on Listed Companies’ Articles of Incorporation in 1997.9  
According to CSRC, a Chinese listed company may alter the content recommended in the 
Guidelines to accommodate its own needs as long as the alteration does not violate laws or 
regulations. While CSRC has revised the Guidelines several times since 1997, it always 
recommends a provision stipulating the operating purpose (jingying zongzhi) in the articles of 
incorporation.10 CSRC does not provide any template for the purpose provision, leaving it to the 
company’s discretion. In addition to the corporate purpose clause, the Guidelines recommend 
                                                          
7 Xiaoxing Chen, ‘Rational Consideration on the Legal Rule of Corporate Social Responsibility: A 
Comment on Article 5 of Chinese Company Law’ in Baoshu Wang (eds), China Commercial Law Annual 2009 
(Peking University Press 2009) 50-53 (in Chinese). 
8 Junhai Liu, Institutional Innovations of New Corporate Law: Legislative and Judicial Controversies (Law 
Press 2007) 555 (in Chinese). 
9 The Guidelines were first published on December 16, 1997 and then revised in 2006, 2014 and 2016.  
10 The Guidelines on Listed Companies’ Articles of Incorporation (2016), art. 12.  
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listed companies to include a provision of the scope of business operation (jingying fanwei). 
Under the business scope clause, listed companies usually provide a long list of business 
activities along industry or product lines.  
The separation of the operating purpose clause and the business scope clause 
disaggregates the notion of corporate purpose into ‘strategic purpose’ and ‘tactical purpose.’11 
The operating purpose clause concerns the strategic purpose, ‘the ultimate end of the 
corporation’.12 Shareholder wealth maximization is a good example. In contrast, the business 
scope clause is the company’s tactical purpose. It refers to the permitted scope of business, such 
as manufacturing cars or selling insurance. The tactical purpose was once part of the basis to 
limit corporate activities and liabilities through the doctrine of ultra vires. Historically, corporate 
acts that fell outside the scope of business specified in the corporate charter were considered 
invalid. The trend of modern statutes and judicial practices in many jurisdictions including China 
has been to abandon the doctrine of ultra vires.13 The distinction between the operating purpose 
clause and the business scope clause disentangles the purpose discussion from the mostly 
abolished doctrine of ultra vires and helps focus on the critical part of the purpose controversy.  
                                                          
11 George A. Mocsary, ‘Freedom of Corporate Purpose’ (2017) 2016 Brigham Young University Law 
Review 1319, 1364-1365 (discussing the differences between strategic purpose and tactical purpose). 
12 Mocsary (n 11) 1365. 
13 Chinese courts used to take the position that any corporate act outside the scope of business was invalid. 
In December 1999, the People’s Supreme Court of China overturned the position. See the Supreme People’s Court’s 
Interpretation I on Several Issues concerning the Application of the Contract Law of the People's Republic of China, 
art. 10 (providing that ‘Where a party concludes a contract beyond its business scope, the people's court shall not 
determine the contract as void for this reason, unless such a contract violates the state’s laws on restricted business 
operations, franchise operations or prohibited business operations’). China’s 2006 Company Act further removed the 
provision that required companies to do business within the scope of business operation.   
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3. Configuring the Purpose Clause: A Hypothetical Exercise 
As Chinese corporate statutes and securities regulations provide little guidance on how to 
formulate the corporate purpose clause, how do Chinese public companies fill in the empty 
clause? This section develops some general hypotheses regarding the likely configuration of 
purpose clauses by drawing on the contractarian theory of the firm while taking into account the 
Chinese institutional context.  
In the contractarian vision, the corporation is a web or nexus of explicit and implicit 
contracts among various parties associated with the firm, including shareholders, managers, 
employees, creditors, communities, etc.14 Corporate participants may draft customized contracts 
to govern their relationships. In this regard, it allows corporate participants to contractually 
determine the purpose of the corporation. One of the most important governance contracts is the 
articles of incorporation, an agreement to govern the relationship between the corporation and its 
shareholders. The agreement establishes rights and obligations that shareholders can legally 
enforce and that cannot be changed without a majority vote of shareholders. Consequently, the 
protection of shareholder interests is expected to be a primary feature of the purpose clause in the 
articles of incorporation.   
Note that shareholders are not a homogenous group.15  They may carry different interests 
and thus hold different views on corporate purpose. In the Chinese context, the state-owner is 
often known to pursue non-economic goals such as social harmony, political stability, and 
control over national strategic resources.16 The state-owner may have interests to seek a 
                                                          
14 Frank H. Easterbrook and Daniel R. Fischel, The Economic Structure Of Corporate Law (Harvard 
University Press 1996) 1-39. 
15 Daniel J.H. Greenwood, ‘Fictional Shareholders: For Whom Are Corporate Managers Trustees, 
Revisited’ (1996) 69 Southern California Law Review 1021.  
16 Jiangyu Wang, ‘The Political Logic of Corporate Governance in China’s State-owned Enterprises’ 
(2014) 47 Cornell International Law Journal 631 (explaining the strategic objectives of the Chinese state-owner and 
how that influences the governance structure of Chinese state-owned enterprises). 
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contractual term that pursues such non-economic objectives. In this regard, it suggests that state-
controlled companies are more likely to include non-profit-seeking objectives in the purpose 
clause, compared with their non-state-owned counterparts.  
The contractarian theory envisions diversity in contractual terms. As Easterbrook and 
Fischel said, ‘Agreements [including articles of incorporation] that have arisen are wonderfully 
diverse, matching the diversity of economic activity carried on within corporations.’17 
Accordingly, corporate attributes such as industry and firm size may contribute to the contractual 
diversity. For instance, companies in different industries are expected to have dissimilar 
contractual terms including purpose clauses. Large and small firms may have different business 
development strategies, which may lead to divergent purpose clauses. In fact, such contractual 
diversity may arise from not only internal economic activity but also the external environment in 
which corporations operate. For instance, different geographical regions may present different 
economic, social, political, or institutional needs that give rise to divergent corporate purposes.    
Moreover, time is another source of diversity as the external environment may change 
over time.  Corporate purposes formulated in different temporal frames may be dissimilar from 
each other. The purpose clause as a legal statement of corporate objective may evolve 
particularly with changes in the legal environment. The express recognition of CSR in the 2006 
Company Act is probably the most important legal change that may affect the configuration of 
the purpose clauses of Chinese companies. As noted in section 2, while the enforceability of the 
CSR provision under the corporate statute is controversial, it unquestionably creates a pro-CSR 
legal environment. One might expect that after the legal change in 2006 Chinese companies may 
                                                          
17 Easterbrook and Fischel (n 14) 12. 
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give more attention to non-shareholders’ interests and/or less emphasis on shareholder wealth 
maximization in their purpose clauses.    
 As different companies face different internal and external needs, their purpose clauses 
may differ in countless possible ways.18 Given that it is infeasible to enumerate and compare all 
possible corporate objectives, a taxonomy approach may be a helpful way to describe the 
universe of corporate objectives. Scholars often see two kinds of corporate purposes: shareholder 
value maximization versus stakeholder welfare maximization.19 The former holds that the sole 
purpose of the corporation is to maximize profits for shareholders, whereas the latter views that 
the corporate purpose is to maximize welfare for all corporate participants including not only 
shareholders but also employees, suppliers, communities, etc. Intuitively, a pro-shareholder 
purpose is predicted to have a positive relationship with financial performance, whereas a pro-
stakeholder purpose is expected to have a positive relationship with CSR performance.   
 
4. An Empirical Analysis of Chinese Listed Companies’ Purpose Clauses 
 At present, China has more than 3,000 companies listed on the Shanghai and Shenzhen 
Stock Exchanges. Using systematic sampling, this article examines a random sample of 337 
companies listed on the two stock exchanges.20 China’s listed companies are required to publish 
                                                          
18 While contractarians take shareholder wealth maximization as the optimal purpose of the corporation, 
they acknowledge that corporate participants have freedom to customize the purpose. For instance, Professor 
Stephen Bainbridge recently indicated that shareholder wealth maximization is a default rule subject to the articles 
of incorporation. When discussing ice cream maker Ben & Jerry’s social purpose, he wrote: “As a contractarian, 
however, if Ben & Jerry went public with a CSR provision in their articles, I'd have no objection.” See Stephan 
Bainbridge, ‘Does Ebay Spell Doom For Corporate Social Responsibility?’, 
<http://www.professorbainbridge.com/professorbainbridgecom/2010/12/does-ebay-spell-doom-for-corproate-social-
responsibility.html> accessed 24 January 2019.  
19 For shareholder wealth maximization, see e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, ‘Director Primacy: The Means 
and Ends of Corporate Governance’ (2003) 97 Northwestern University Law Review 547. For stakeholder welfare 
maximization, see e.g., Edward R. Freeman, Strategic Management: A Stakeholder Approach (Pitman 1984).  
20 The sample is representative of the population. The sample and the population do not show any 
statistically difference in terms of ownership distribution, financial performance, listing year, geographical 
distribution and industry distribution.   
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their articles of incorporation. Their articles of incorporation were collected from CNINFO, the 
disclosure website officially designated by CSRC.21 The data collection was completed by the 
end of December 2017. This article focuses on the articles of incorporation effective as of 2017, 
but it also traces their historical amendments. 
 
4.1. Component Analysis 
 Often, companies construct the purpose clause with the view to the interests of different 
stakeholders (including shareholders and others). This stakeholder-focus approach is probably 
influenced by the central question of the corporate purpose debate: in whose interest should the 
corporation be managed – shareholders, other stakeholders or the corporation itself? Table 1 
shows the types of stakeholders expressly mentioned in the purpose clauses of the 2017 articles 
of incorporation. The categories are not mutually exclusive. A company may include various 
stakeholders in the purpose clause. Table 1 shows that shareholders are the most significant 
interest group, consistent with the prediction in section 3.  Close to 69% of the sample firms 
expressly claim the importance of shareholder value, though the exact language of shareholder 
importance varies across companies. In the scholarly debate of corporate purpose, a popular view 
is that the corporation should ‘maximize’ shareholder wealth or act in the ‘best’ interest of 
shareholders. In the dataset, only a third of the companies that speak about shareholders (80/231) 
use the term of ‘maximization’ or ‘best’ return/interest. Often, companies use softer language 
including ‘good returns’, ‘satisfactory returns’, ‘reasonable returns’, ‘create value’ or ‘protect 
legal rights’ for shareholders.   
                                                          
21 CNINFO, http://www.cninfo.com.cn/cninfo-new/index.  
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  In addition to shareholder value, Chinese listed companies usually claim to serve non-
shareholder stakeholders’ interests. As Table 1 shows, about 60% of the companies expressly 
claim to consider national, societal or regional interests in the course of doing business. About 
37% of the companies treat the corporation as a distinct entity along with other stakeholders.22 
Around 25% of the companies have an express emphasis on consumers’ interests. Note that 
while Chinese corporate law addresses employees’ interests, only 17.2% of the companies refer 
to employees in their purpose clauses. Only 0.6% of the companies include environmental 
protection in their purpose clauses. None of the companies mentions creditors. When companies 
include multiple stakeholders in the purpose clause, they rarely specify the priority of the 
stakeholders. It seems that most of the time companies treat all the mentioned stakeholders 
equally. 
 
Table 1. Types of Stakeholders Expressly Included in the Purpose Clause (2017) 
Type of Stakeholders 
 
Number of Firms 
 
Percentage of Firms 
 
Shareholder 231 68.6% 
Nation/Society/Region 202 59.9% 
Corporation 126 37.4% 
Consumer 84 24.9% 
Employee 58 17.2% 
Environment 2 0.6% 
Creditor 0 0.0% 
Source: data compiled by author.  
 
 
                                                          
22 For example, CSG Holding Co., Ltd.’s purpose clause is as follows: ‘To take the development of China’s 
glass industry and new energy as a responsibility, to be an industry leader with international competitiveness as the 
target, to create the maximum value for shareholders, to realize the co-creation, co-sharing and co-development for 
shareholders, the corporation, and employees’ [emphasis added by author]. 
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Table 2 examines the relationship between stakeholder references and ownership types. 23 
Table 2 shows that 82% of the state-controlled companies refer to shareholders’ interest in the 
purpose clause while 63% of the non-state-controlled companies do the same. The result is rather 
counterintuitive given that state-controlled companies are often known to pursue non-economic 
goals and be less committed to profit maximization.24 Two hypotheses may be offered here to 
explain this puzzling observation. First, as the state is the controlling shareholder, the emphasis 
on shareholder value is consistent with the state’s interests. The Chinese state-owner is known to 
pursue non-financial goals. In this regard, the meaning of shareholder value may be different 
from the typical understanding of shareholder wealth maximization that focuses on economic 
gains.  Second, as state-owned enterprises are often criticized for their inferior financial 
performance, their emphasis on shareholder value in the purpose clause may be intended to 
signal their financial commitment to outside investors. 
 Table 2 also shows that the non-state-controlled firms are more likely to emphasize 
consumers’ interests in the purpose clause, compared with their state-controlled counterparts. A 
possible explanation is that the non-state-controlled firms are more market-oriented and attentive 
to consumer demands. For other stakeholder types, the differences are not statistically significant 
between the state-controlled and the non-state-controlled companies.  
 
 
                                                          
23 As an empirical matter, whether a listed firm is categorized as a state-controlled enterprise depends on 
the nature of the ultimate controlling shareholder. Chinese listed companies are required to state in the annual report 
the identity of the ultimate controlling shareholder. The database categorizes ownership types based on such 
information.  
24 Existing literature has provided a range of commonly stated reasons for state ownership, including 
providing public goods, improving labor relations, encouraging economic development and industrialization, etc. 
OECD, ‘State-Owned Enterprise Governance: A Stocktaking of Government Rationales for Enterprise Ownership’ 
(2015) < https://read.oecd-ilibrary.org/governance/state-owned-enterprise-governance_9789264239944-en#page1> 
accessed 5 November 2018. 
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Table 2. Relationship between Stakeholder References and Ownership Types 
Type of Stakeholders 
Referred 
Ownership Type Significance test 
 State- 
Controlled 
Non-State-
Controlled 
 
Shareholder 82% 63% significant (p=.001) 
Nation/Society/Region 65% 58% insignificant (p=.218) 
Corporation 35% 38% insignificant (p=.556) 
Consumer 17% 28% significant (p=.029) 
Employee 14% 19% insignificant (p=.311) 
Environment 0% 0.8% insignificant (p=.358) 
Note: p-value < .05 indicates the difference is statistically significant. 
As discussed above, framing corporate purposes around different stakeholders’ interests 
is a common practice to formulate the purpose clauses. In addition, compliance with the law and 
internationalization are two other common ingredients of the purpose clauses. In the dataset, 
16.9% of the companies mention compliance with the law and 22.8% refer to internationalization 
as part of the corporate purpose.   
 
4.2. Trend Analysis 
The hypothetical exercise in section 3 speculates that the purpose clause may change over 
time. In the dataset, 44 firms have ever made at least one amendment to their purpose clauses 
since 2004. Table 3 shows the types of change. Of the 44 amendments, five cases involve slight 
changes in the language used in the purpose clause.25 Other 39 cases involve substantive changes 
                                                          
25 For example, Wuhan Hanshang Group Co., Ltd. removed the second paragraph of its purpose clause. Its 
original purpose clause was as follows:  
Paragraph I: ‘Under the guidance of national macro adjustments and independent operation in response to 
market demands, to increase economic efficiency, labor productivity and assets as the goal, insist socialism as the 
operation direction, adequately use strong economic resources, human resources and rich modern management 
experiences, demonstrate strengths of market competitiveness, use a conglomerate business to provide high quality 
services to domestic and international customers, to increase profits for the corporation and shareholders, to make 
contributions to the nation’s economy’. 
Paragraph II: ‘The company’s motto is: unity, competition, pragmatism, and innovation’. 
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where companies may add or remove, highlight or downplay any stakeholders. 26 Of the 39 
substantive changes, ten cases are oriented toward shareholders (such as adding or highlighting 
shareholders); 18 cases are oriented toward other stakeholders (such as adding or highlighting 
employees or deleting shareholders); 11 cases’ amendment orientation is ambiguous (such as 
adding shareholders as well as employees).  The results here show that purpose-clause 
amendments do not occur often. The reason may be that the purpose clause is a fundamental 
provision in the corporate constitution. As a foundation, the purpose clause tends to have great 
stability rather than frequent changes. 
 
Table 3. Types of Purpose-Clause Amendments 
Type of Change Number of Firms 
Stylistic (non-substantive) 5 
Substantive  
                  Oriented toward shareholders 10 
                  Oriented toward stakeholders 18 
                  Unclear 11 
Total 44 
Source: data compiled by author. 
 The most common cause of amendments to the purpose clause is material asset 
reorganization (29 cases), often involving changes in major shareholders (such as top ten 
shareholders). It suggests that the identity of shareholders has great influence on the content of 
                                                          
26 For instance, Aurora Optoelectronics Co., Ltd., had a comprehensive revision to its articles of 
incorporation in 2015 because of its material asset reorganization. The revised purpose clause deletes shareholders 
and focuses on customers and the corporate value. Its original purpose clause was read as follows: ‘To seek 
solidarity, be brave for progress, be efficient and pragmatic, to continuously explore the development of the 
pharmaceutical industry, to increase the company’s product market share, to use the most stringent methods and 
scientific management methods to research and produce reliable, high-quality and safe drugs; to be a modern 
corporation that has solid management foundations, good quality reputations, technology advancements, and bright 
development future, with the hope of remarkable economic profits for shareholders to acquire good returns’.   
Its revised purpose clause is as follows: ‘To place customers first, be an industry leader, be technology 
guaranteed, and be continuously innovative; to provide customers with high quality large size sapphire materials and 
products; to be an internationally competitive sapphire supplier and realize the maximization of corporate value’.   
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the purpose clause. When the amendment was caused by major asset restructuring, the change 
was substantive in content rather than merely stylistic. Other causes of change are rare. In the 
absence of ownership change, two companies expressly explained that the change to the purpose 
clause was intended to improve corporate governance.27 Both of the companies added the 
importance of societal contribution in their revised purpose clauses.     
Companies always conduct a careful review and design of their articles of incorporation 
before initial public offering (IPO). After IPO, their purpose clauses often remain unchanged. 
The IPO timing presents a good observation window to capture the contemporary trend in 
formulating the purpose clause. Figure 1 shows the relationship between the sample firms’ IPO 
timing and their purpose clauses. The state-controlled sample companies demonstrate a stable 
trend of referring to shareholder value in their purpose clauses. Except for a decrease during the 
IPO period of 2001-2005, more than 80% of the state-controlled sample companies made express 
reference to shareholders in their purpose clauses. In comparison, the non-state-controlled 
sample companies demonstrate the rise and decline of shareholder value over the years. More 
than 90% of the non-state-controlled sample companies that undertook IPOs in the mid-late 
1990s referenced shareholder interests. However, a significant decline of shareholder reference 
began at the turn of the century.  In particular, a noticeable decline followed the 2006 new 
company law that expressly recognizes CSR. Less than 55% of the non-state-controlled sample 
firms that undertook IPOs during 2016-2017 referred to shareholders in their purpose clauses 
while 80% of the state-controlled sample firms still did. Interesting to note is that before the 
2006 Company Act, the state-controlled and non-state-controlled companies did not demonstrate 
                                                          
27 The two companies were Changchun High and New Technology Industry (Group) Inc. and Do-fluoride 
Chemicals Co., Ltd. 
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any statistically significant different pattern in terms of the shareholder value statement.28 
However, their divergence occurred after the new company law that gives express recognition of 
CSR.29 The divergence may be explained from economic, legal and political perspectives. First, 
given that ample empirical evidence shows a negative association between state ownership and 
financial performance,30 state-controlled firms may have a greater need to signal their 
commitment to shareholder value. Second, the translation of the CSR provision in the corporate 
statute into the practice of articles of incorporation requires sensitivity to law and corporate 
governance. It is often believed that China’s non-state-controlled firms have better corporate 
governance than their state-controlled counterparts do.31 Thus, the state-controlled firms may 
have inertia to make the legal change. Third, under China’s ‘state capitalism’ or ‘authoritarian 
capitalism’ where the state exerts influential power over the economy,32 the non-state-controlled 
companies may use the purpose clause as a strategic mechanism to signal their allegiance to the 
state. The Chinese Communist Party has formally declared that that ‘building a harmonious 
                                                          
28 The p-value for Z test for the period of 1990-1995 is 0.40654; p= 0.27572 for the period of 1996-2000;  
p= 0.77948 for the period of 2001-2005.  
29 The p-value for Z test for the period of 2006-2010 is p= 0.00072; p=0.01016 for the period of 2011-2015; 
p=0.00988 for the period of 2016-2017. 
30 Chong-En Bai et al., ‘How Does Privatization Work in China?’ (2009) 37 Journal of Comparative 
Economics 453 (showing that SOEs have better profitability after privatization); Zhangkai Huang and Kun Wang, 
‘Ultimate Privatization and Change in Firm Performance: Evidence from China’ (2011) 22 China Economic Review 
121 (showing that SOEs have better financial performance after privatization).  
31 There is a vast body of literature on Chinese corporate governance. The comparison of state-controlled 
and non-state-controlled firms has been a standard practice in empirical studies of Chinese corporate governance. It 
is impossible to summarize all aspects of Chinese corporate governance here. Nevertheless, empirical studies 
generally show that non-state-owned firms have better performance with regard to different corporate governance 
indicators. For example, scholars have found that the pay for performance link is stronger for non-state-controlled 
firms. Martin J. Conyon and Lerong He, ‘Executive Compensation and Corporate Governance in China’ (2011) 17 
Journal of Corporate Finance 1158; Michael Firth et al., ‘Corporate Performance and CEO Compensation in China’ 
(2006) 12 Journal of Corporate Finance 693. 
32 Barry Naughton and Kellee S. Tsai eds., State Capitalism, Institutional Adaptation, and The Chinese 
Miracle (Cambridge University Press 2015); Li-Wen Lin and Curtis J. Milhaupt, ‘We Are the (National) 
Champions: Understanding the Mechanisms of State Capitalism in China’ (2013) 65 Stanford Law Review 697; 
James McGregor, No Ancient Wisdom, No Followers: The Challenges Of Chinese Authoritarian Capitalism 
(Prospecta Press 2012). 
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society’ is the long-term goal of the Chinese socialism.33 According to the Party’s declaration, 
there are many existing problems that can cause conflicts and damage social harmony, mainly 
including: inequality in regional development, environmental pollution, unemployment, income 
inequality, etc. As the Party makes it clear, solving these problems is the Party’s current chief 
mission.34 The non-state-controlled companies’ de-emphasis on shareholder value and their 
celebration of societal interests are consistent with the state’s interest in building ‘harmonious 
society.’ 
 
Figure 1. Relationship between the Sample Firms’ IPO Timing and Their Purpose Clauses 
 
Source: data compiled by author. 
 
                                                          
33 The idea of “harmonious society” was formally adopted in the Fourth Meeting of the 16th Central 
Committee of the Communist Party of China (October 11, 2006).  
34  See (n 33); see also Li-Wen Lin, “Corporate Social Responsibility in China: Window Dressing or 
Structural Change” (2010) 28 Berkeley International Law Journal 64, 88 (discussing the relationship between CSR 
and the government’s social harmony policy in China). 
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4.3. Similarity Analysis 
Chinese listed companies are quite innovative in formulating their purpose clauses. 
Rather than using a boilerplate, each company constructs its own purpose statement. It is 
empirically important to understand what causes companies to have similar or different purpose 
clauses. Meanwhile, it is empirically challenging to compare similarities and differences given 
the variety of purpose clauses stated in qualitative terms. To analyze the similarity of the sample 
firms’ purpose clauses, this article uses the word similarity function of NVivo, a qualitative data 
analysis software produced by QSR International and commonly used by academics. It uses a 
similarity metric (i.e., Pearson correlation coefficient) to measure the correlation between a pair 
of purpose clauses. The sample size (337) generates 56,616 pairs of purpose clauses. Each pair 
has a correlation coefficient to describe the similarity between two purpose clauses.  
Figure 2 shows the distribution of the pair correlations. In the dataset, only one pair has a 
correlation coefficient as large as one, which means that only two companies have exactly the 
same purpose clause. Both of the companies are non-state-controlled, in the same industry and 
similar in their IPO timing. The most dissimilar pair has a correlation coefficient as small as 
-.032, which is close to zero correlation.35 The average correlation coefficient is .208, which 
suggests a low correlation and great diversity in constructing the purpose clauses.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
35 The two companies are both non-state-owned companies, but in different industries and far apart in IPO 
timing (15 years apart). 
20 
 
Figure 2. Distribution of Purpose-Clause Correlation Pairs  
 
Note: A correlation coefficient ranges between 1 and -1. The rule of thumb for interpreting the 
strength of correlation is as follows:  0 means no correlation; +.3 (-.3) indicates a weak positive 
(negative) relationship; +.5 (-.5) indicates a moderate positive (negative) relationship; +.8 (-.8) 
indicates a strong positive (negative) relationship; +1 (-1) indicates a perfect positive (negative) 
relationship. 
 
 To investigate factors that influence similarity, this article presents an ordinary least 
squared regression analysis with the correlation coefficient for a pair of purpose clauses as the 
dependent variable.  Independent variables are as follows. First, the variable of whether the two 
companies are in the same industry (yes=1; no=0) anticipates that the companies are more likely 
to have similar purpose clauses if they are in the same industry. Second, the variable of whether 
the two companies retain the same law firm (yes=1; no=0) expects that law firms play an 
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norms.36 Third, the variable of whether both of the two companies adopt the current version of 
the purpose clause in the same period (both before 2006 or both in/after 2006 =1, otherwise 0) 
considers the potential effects of legal change introduced by the 2006 Company Act. Fourth, the 
regression analysis includes the variable of whether the two companies are of the same 
ownership type (both state-owned or both non-state-owned =1, otherwise=0). It expects that 
firms of the same ownership type are more likely to have similar purpose clauses. Fifth, as 
hypothesized in section 3, geographical proximity may play a role in diffusing legal norms. 
Therefore, it includes the variable of whether the two companies are headquartered in the same 
province (yes=1; no=0). Finally, the variable of logged asset difference considers that firms 
similar in size may adopt similar purpose clauses.  
 The regression analysis shows that all the independent variables are statistically 
significant (p<.001). Figure 3 shows the average marginal effects with 95% confidence internals 
(CIs) based on the regression model.37 The results suggest that companies have greater similarity 
in their purpose clauses when they are in the same industry, of the same ownership type, 
headquartered in the same province, use the same law firm, or adopt the clause in the same 
period; meanwhile, firms that have larger differences in asset size have greater dissimilarity in 
their purpose clauses. Among all the five dichotomous variables,38 the time of adopting the 
purpose clause is a particularly salient factor.  Companies follow trends in formulating their 
                                                          
36 There is a large body of sociological and organizational science literature on the diffusion of innovation. 
According to the literature, professions are important agents that spread new practices throughout the system. For a 
brief review of the literature, David Strang and Sarah A. Soule, ‘Diffusion in Organizations and Social Movements: 
From Hybrid Corn to Poison Pills’ (1998) 24 Annual Review of Sociology 265.      
37 Figure 3 also shows which variable is statistically significant. If the confidence interval does not include 
the value of zero effect (the red line), there is a statistically significant effect. All the confidence intervals in Figure 3 
do not include the value of zero effect and therefore suggest statistically significant effects. 
38 In Figure 3, the only variable that is not a dichotomous variable but a continuous variable is logged asset 
difference.   
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purpose clauses. The 2006 Company Act plays a role in shaping the trend. The results suggest 
that the construction of corporate purpose evolves with the changing legal environment. 
 
Figure 3. Relationships between Purpose Clause Similarity and Corporate Attributes  
 
Overall, the similarity analysis confirms the great diversity of corporate purposes. 
Consistent with the hypotheses in section 3, the diversity arises from companies’ internal 
attributes such as size, industry and ownership types. It also arises from the external environment 
in which companies operate, such as legal and geographical environments. 
 
4.4. Financial Performance Analysis 
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relationship between financial performance and the shareholder value statement in the purpose 
clause during the period of 2015-2017. It shows that controlling for ownership type, number of 
employees and industry, companies whose purpose clause expressly references shareholders 
have inferior financial performance, compared to those whose purpose clause does not reference 
shareholders at all. In other words, companies that purposefully leave shareholders out of the 
purpose clause have better financial performance than those that expressly include shareholders. 
Table 4 shows that the coefficients for the variable of shareholder inclusion in the purpose clause 
are all negative. While the negative relationship is only marginally significant when financial 
performance is measured as ROA or ROE, it is statistically significant when performance is 
measured as ROIC. 
The negative association between shareholder-oriented corporate purpose and firm 
financial performance is contrary to what one might expect. On the one hand, poor performing 
companies may have more incentives to use the purpose clause as a signaling device to 
demonstrate their commitment to profit maximization. Better performing companies may have 
more freedom in moving beyond shareholder value and promoting non-financial purposes, or 
may simply have less need to signal their commitment to shareholders. On the other hand, it 
could be possible that focus on shareholder value is detrimental to financial performance.39 For 
example, a corporation may have problems to attract high-quality employees, loyal customers, 
reliable suppliers, etc. when such non-shareholder stakeholders feel that their rights are not well 
protected. Still, it is important to note that having a shareholder-oriented purpose clause in the 
                                                          
39 Lynn A. Stout, The Shareholder Value Myth (Berrett-Koehler Publishers 2012) 47-60 (observing that 
empirical studies provide no clear evidence that shareholder-friendly governance structures are associated with 
better financial performance; reporting that some studies even show a negative association).   
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charter does not mean actual implementation of pro-shareholder decision-making and culture in 
the company. In this regard, the former explanation seems more plausible than the latter.  
 
Table 4. Random-Effects GLS Regression of Financial Performance on Purpose Clauses (2015-
2017) 40 
 Dependent Variables 
 Return on Assets 
(ROA) 
Return on Equity 
(ROE) 
Return on Invested 
Capital (ROIC) 
Shareholder Included in Purpose 
Clause (yes=1; no=0) 
 
-1.483† 
(.826) 
-2.540† 
(1.507) 
-2.391* 
(1.193) 
Ownership Type  
(state-controlled=1; otherwise=0) 
 
-2.459*** 
(.676) 
-4.160** 
(1.291) 
-2.944** 
(1.011) 
Number of Employees  
(thousand) 
 
.013† 
(.007) 
.025† 
(.013) 
.020† 
(.013) 
Industry Dummies  
 
Included Included Included 
Constant 4.365*** 
(1.050) 
15.644*** 
(1.477) 
10.433** 
(3.140) 
Number of Observations 956 955 923 
Note: robust standard errors in parenthesis. † p<.1; * p <.05; ** p<.01; ***p<.001. All the data 
except for purpose clauses were collected from CSMAR, a widely used database on China’s 
listed companies.  
  
4.5. CSR Performance Analysis 
 As Table 2 shows, a large number of the sample companies expressly mention non-
shareholder stakeholders such as nation, society, consumers and employees in their purpose 
clauses. It is expected that companies with special attention to non-shareholder interests in the 
                                                          
40 For panel data analysis, a fixed-effects model is inappropriate to investigate time-invariant causes of the 
dependent variable. In this sample, many subjects change little or not at all in the independent variables. The 
Hausman test shows that the preferred model is random effects.  
Without missing data, there would be 1011 (i.e., 337*3) observations. There are 55 unavailable 
observations for the purpose clause variable (because some firms that went public in 2016/2017 did not disclose 
information about their pre-IPO articles of incorporation and thus their purpose clauses for the years of 2015/2016 
were unknown), 36 missing observations in ROIC, one missing observation in ROE. 
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purpose statement may have better performance of corporate social responsibility (CSR) than 
those without giving any remarks. As there is no consensus on CSR metrics, it is challenging to 
measure CSR performance.41 Nevertheless, a commonly accepted bottom-line indicator of CSR 
performance is whether the company publishes any CSR reports. Table 5 reports a regression 
analysis on the relationship between CSR reporting and the express inclusion of non-shareholder 
stakeholders in the purpose clause.   
 As Table 5 shows, controlling for ownership type, number of employees, financial 
performance and industry, companies that expressly refer to stakeholders in the purpose clause 
are more likely to publish CSR reports (i.e., all the coefficients for the variable of stakeholders 
included in the purpose clause are positive). However, the positive association is statistically 
insignificant. In other words, there is little evidence showing that express reference to non-
shareholder interests in the purpose clause contributes to CSR reporting behavior. The empirical 
results are not surprising given that non-shareholder stakeholders have no clear right to sue under 
the corporate charter or the corporate statute. While a large number of the sample companies 
include the protection of non-shareholder stakeholders’ interests in the purpose clause, none of 
them provides a clear enforcement right in the corporate charter. China’s corporate statute also 
does not provide any enforcement rights for stakeholders such as employees, despite that the 
statute expressly declares that the corporation should protect employees’ interest in its decision-
making process.           
       
                                                          
41 Moreover, although some CSR performance rankings are available in China, these rankings focus on 
non-listed companies or top 500 listed companies by market capitalization, which are inappropriate to use for the 
sample. 
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Table 5. Random-Effects Probit Regression of CSR Reporting on Purpose Clauses (2015-2017)42 
 
 
 
Dependent Variable:  
whether publishing a CSR report in a given year 
(yes=1; no=0) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Stakeholders Included in Purpose Clause 
(yes=1; no=0) 
 
.816 
(.622) 
1.031 
(.622) 
.942 
(.632) 
Ownership Type  
(state-controlled=1; otherwise=0) 
 
3.984*** 
(.705) 
4.686*** 
(.763) 
4.671*** 
(.809) 
Number of Employees  
(thousand) 
 
.378*** 
(.074) 
.286*** 
(.070) 
.286*** 
(.049) 
Financial Controls:    
     ROA 
 
-.054 
(.024) 
  
     ROE 
 
 -.017 
(.012) 
 
     ROIC 
 
 
  -.024 
(.015) 
Industry Dummies  
 
Included Included Included 
Constant 
 
.401 
(1.748) 
.384 
(1.963) 
-1.376 
(1.941) 
Number of Observations 918 917 885 
Log Likelihood -263.584 -265.946 -263.778 
Wald Chi-Square (16) 111.39*** 109.62*** 122.59*** 
Note: * p <.05; ** p<.01; ***p<.001. The data for the dependent variable was manually  
collected from corporate annual reports (a Chinese listed company is required to make a 
statement in the annual report whether it publishes a stand-alone CSR report in the year) and 
corporate websites. The data for all the independent variables except for the purpose clause were 
collected from CSMAR, a widely used database on China’s listed companies. 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
42 Probit and logit models are used when the dependent variable is a dichotomous variable. This author 
performed both models. The results of the logit model (unreported in this article) are similar to the results of the 
probit model reported in Table 5.      
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5. Implications and Questions 
5.1. Implications for the Scholarly Debate about Corporate Purpose  
 Scholars have been debating the normative purpose of the corporation for a long time.43 
The debate has developed along two major competing views: shareholder wealth maximization 
versus stakeholder welfare maximization. The empirical charter data of Chinese listed companies 
reveals some blind spots in the scholarly debate.  
 The scholarly debate has largely continued in theoretical isolation with limited sensitivity 
to realities. The debate implicitly assumes that there must be only one best purpose for all 
corporations, regardless of individual corporate attributes and institutional variables. However, in 
reality, each corporation may have its unique organizational needs. For example, as found in this 
article, Chinese state-controlled companies, compared to non-state-controlled ones, are more 
likely to highlight shareholder value partly out of the need to signal profit commitment. In 
addition, different corporations may encounter different institutional demands. Corporate 
purpose cannot be defined without reference to the political, economic, and legal environments 
in which the corporation is embedded. The Chinese experience illustrates this institutional 
impact on the construction of corporate purpose. As this article shows, a great majority of the 
Chinese corporations consider the interests of a variety of stakeholders rather than taking 
shareholder wealth maximization as the single exclusive goal of the corporation. China’s 
political economy and its recent legal recognition of corporate social responsibility are important 
factors in adopting this stakeholder perspective.  
Moreover, the debate implicitly assumes that there should be a stable, unchanging 
purpose for the corporation. However, corporate purpose is not static and may change quite 
                                                          
43 See (n 1). 
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quickly. The two-decade data examined in this article shows the evolution of the prevailing 
corporate purpose in China, from the celebration of shareholders in most of the corporate 
charters in the 1990s to a significant downplay of shareholders beginning after the turn of the 
century.  
Furthermore, there is a gap between theoretical purposes and practical purposes. Scholars 
heavily use the terms of ‘maximization’ and ‘best interests’ when constructing the purpose 
theories. The practical experience in China suggests that companies rarely adopt the term of 
‘maximization’ to describe their objectives. Instead, companies often use terms such as ‘good 
returns’ or ‘satisfactory returns’, even when they claim that the pursuit of shareholders’ interests 
is the sole purpose.44 How to explain the gap between the idealistic purposes envisioned by 
scholars and practical purposes professed by corporations? One possible explanation from the 
perspective of economics is that scholars simulate the corporate purpose in a stylized world of 
economics where humans are rational actors and act to ‘maximize’ their utility or welfare, 
whereas corporate managers (and controlling shareholders) operating business in the real world 
are more sensitive to the problem of ‘bounded rationality’ and thus ‘aim at a “satisfactory” 
welfare achievement instead of the best possible outcome’.45 From a legal perspective, 
maximum/best is a standard higher than good or satisfactory. Corporate managers (and 
controlling shareholders) whose behavior may be evaluated against the legal standard have 
incentives to set a lower bar in their own favor. Whether it is motivated by bounded rationality or 
self-interest, the practical use of ‘satisfactory returns’ (whether for shareholders only or for all 
stakeholders) moderates the tension between the two competing theories.   
                                                          
44 For example, Zhongshan Public Utilities’ purpose clause is short and simple. It provides that ‘The 
purpose is to generate good economic returns for shareholders’. 
45 David G. Yosifon, ‘The Law of Corporate Purpose’ (2013) 10 Berkeley Business Law Journal 181, 219-
221. 
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5.2. Pragmatic Questions  
5.2.1. Does the Corporate Purpose Clause Matter? 
The Chinese experience raises questions about whether the corporate purpose clause 
really matters in practice. As the empirical data shows, companies that highlight the interests of 
shareholders in the purpose clause do not demonstrate better financial performance; companies 
that celebrate the interests of non-shareholder stakeholders in the purpose clause are not more 
likely to engage in CSR reporting. It suggests that companies use the purpose clause to pay lip 
service for the interests of shareholders and/or other stakeholders.  
The lack of practical importance may be attributable to the institutional constraints and 
the intrinsic nature of the purpose clause. As to institutional constraints, Chinese corporate 
governance generally suffers from the lack of enforcement.46 Moreover, existing research shows 
that the Chinese Communist Party and the government play a big role outside the ordinary 
corporate governance organs described in the corporate charter.47 The intrinsic nature of the 
purpose clause further exacerbates the enforcement problem. The empirical data shows that the 
language used in the purpose clauses is very broad and vague. The broadness and vagueness is 
necessary given that the purpose clause is a fundamental provision in the corporate constitution 
and serves as the guiding principle of the corporation. If the purpose clause is disputed in court, 
it will entail competent legal infrastructure to interpret the vague language. The legal institutional 
requirements include judges, attorneys and probably even corporate participants familiar with the 
application of broadly stated principles; appropriate legal proceedings and incentives for 
                                                          
46 Donald C. Clarke, ‘Law Without Order in Chinese Corporate Governance Institutions’ (2010) 30 
Northwestern Journal of International Law & Business 131. 
47 Lin and Milhaupt (n 32).  
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plaintiffs and attorneys to bring actions; courts capable of fashioning remedies without clear 
judicial guidance. According to publicly available information, the corporate purpose clause in 
the charter has never been used in any Chinese court case as an argument for or against any 
corporate behavior in the pursuit of shareholders’ or non-shareholders’ interests.48 Chinese courts 
are still in the early stage of familiarizing themselves with the exercise of equity and discretion 
under corporate law.49 Moreover, it is challenging for Chinese courts to apply the corporate 
purpose clause given that it is an indigenous legal innovation and there is limited foreign 
experience to consult with. 
In addition to the concerns about macro-institutional capacity, the micro-rule design 
requires detailed implementation rules to realize the principle-based goal statement. The 
corporate purpose clause should not be a stand-alone provision in the charter. It requires 
complementary provisions to turn the abstract purpose into concrete measures. While the great 
majority of the sample Chinese companies provide that the corporate purpose is to pursue the 
interests of shareholders as well as other stakeholders, none of them adopts any relevant legal 
mechanisms to implement the purpose other than those already provided in the corporate statute. 
China’s corporate statute requires employee participation in board decision making under certain 
circumstances. However, the statute does not give non-shareholder stakeholders such as 
employees any rights to initiate legal proceedings. Empirical studies consistently show that 
                                                          
48 This author conducted a search in China Judgements Online, a Chinese court cases database maintained 
by the People’s Supreme Court of China. By using the keyword “jingying zongzhi” (i.e., operating purpose) as used 
in the articles of incorporation, I found 144 civil cases with reference to the keyword. However, none of the cases 
involved any disputes that required any interpretation or application of the corporate purpose. The reference to 
corporate purpose was simply incidental, usually because it appeared in evidentiary documents.   
49 Empirical studies of Chinese corporate law mainly focus on the judicial application of the vague concept 
of fiduciary duties formally introduced in the Chinese corporate statute in 2006. Guangdong Xu, ‘Directors’ Duties 
in China’ (2013) 14 European Business Organization Law Review 57; Donald C. Clarke and Nicholas C. Howson, 
‘Pathway to Minority Shareholder Protection: Derivative Actions in the People's Republic of China’ in D. Puchniak, 
H. Baum, and M. Ewing-Chow eds., The Derivative Action in Asia: A Comparative And Functional Approach 
(Cambridge University Press 2012) 243-95. 
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employee participation in Chinese corporate governance remains largely symbolic.50 While the 
corporate statute does not give non-shareholder stakeholders any enforcement rights, the 
corporate statute does not prohibit corporations from contractually granting rights to non-
shareholder stakeholders. However, none of the sample corporations undertakes this contractual 
commitment to non-shareholder stakeholders in the charter. Without complementary legal 
mechanisms to realize the grand purpose statement, the purpose clause only serves a signaling or 
window dressing function. 
Still, even without any institutional capacity complication, there is an intrinsic difficulty 
of enforcing multifaceted (and potentially inconsistent) corporate mandates.  If corporate 
managers are required to serve the interests of shareholders, employees, and the broader society, 
etc., it becomes extremely difficult to police management discretion. Managers can make any 
decisions they want and plausibly claim to be serving the interests of a particular stakeholder 
group. That can effectively release managers from any liability. It partly explains why Chinese 
managers and controlling shareholders who exert influence on the content of the articles of 
incorporation tend to include multiple stakeholders in the purpose clause of the articles of 
incorporation.     
Fundamentally, in comparative perspective, whether there is a clear corporate purpose, at 
least stated in the articles of incorporation, seems practically unimportant. As noted, because of 
the institutional constraints and intrinsic nature of the purpose clause, corporations with a firm-
specific purpose declared in the charter, like Chinese listed firms, may simply use the purpose 
                                                          
50 Under China’s corporate statute, limited liability corporations and joint stock corporations are required to 
establish the supervisory board. At least a third of the supervisory board should be representatives elected by 
employees. Empirical studies often use the operation and quality of the supervisory board as a measure of employee 
participation in Chinese corporate governance. See e.g., Weian Li and Chen Hao, ‘An Empirical Research of 
Supervisory Board Governance in China’s Listed Companies,’ (2006) 2006 Journal of Shanghai University of 
Finance and Economics 78 (in Chinese); Limin Wang and Shiquan Wang, ‘An Empirical Analysis of Supervisory 
Board Governance of China’s Private Listed Companies’(2007) 11 Inquiry Into Economic Issues 120 (in Chinese). 
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statement as a marketing device. Meanwhile, corporations in countries like the United States 
rarely have express corporate purpose provisions and seem to get by just fine. It suggests that the 
corporate purpose debate is more of an intellectual exercise than a practical problem that hinders 
the daily business operation.  
 
5.2.2. What Is the Relationship with ‘Social Enterprises’?  
The Chinese experience raises questions about the relationship between the regular 
business corporation and an emerging hybrid business form that simultaneously pursues profit-
making and public good purposes, commonly referred to as ‘social enterprise’. In recent years, 
many countries including Canada, the United Kingdom and the United States have adopted a 
kind of social enterprises.51 The recent emergence of social enterprises aims to challenge 
shareholder wealth maximization as the single exclusive goal of the corporation. A common 
feature of the recent social enterprise statutes requires a purpose statement in the corporate 
charter. In addition to seeking profits, a social enterprise must declare its commitment to creating 
general public benefit and in some cases may be required to declare a specific benefit that the 
business produces. Does China need to follow the trend and adopt a form of social enterprise, 
especially given that the default (prevailing) corporate purpose of the regular business 
                                                          
51 For Canada, Gail Elizabeth Henderson, ‘Could Community Contribution Companies Improve Access to 
Justice?’ (2016) 94 The Canadian Bar Review 209; Carol Liao, ‘A Critical Canadian Perspective on the Benefit 
Corporation’ (2017) 40 Seattle University Law Review 683. For Europe, European Council, A Map of Social 
Enterprises and Their Eco-System in Europe: Synthesis Report (2015).  For UK, see David Cabrelli, ‘A Distinct 
“Social Enterprise” Law in the UK: The Case of the CIC’ (2016) Edinburgh School of Law Research Paper No. 
2016/27, <https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2888486>. For US, J. Haskell Murray, ‘The Social 
Enterprise Law Market’ (2016) 75 Maryland Law Review 541, 543-555 (providing an overview of the social 
enterprise laws in the United States); J. Haskell Murray, ‘Social Enterprise Innovation: Delaware’s Pubic Benefit 
Corporation Law’ (2014) 4 Harvard Business Law Review 345 (evaluating mechanisms to hold directors 
responsible under the Delaware law).  
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corporation is already oriented toward a wide range of stakeholders including society?52 More 
fundamentally, when a contractual approach to corporate purpose is adopted, what is the purpose 
of adopting the legal form of social enterprise? A major difference between the contractual 
approach to corporate purpose for the regular business form and the required dual purposes for 
the social enterprise is that the former gives wide discretion to the corporation to decide whether 
to provide any contractual commitment to stakeholders while the latter statutorily mandates some 
legal commitments to public good purposes. For instance, both the UK community interest 
company and the British Columbia (Canada) community contribution corporation are subject to 
asset-lock and dividend restrictions to ensure that the corporate assets and profits are devoted to 
public goods rather than distributed to shareholders.53 In addition, the western social enterprise 
laws have more teeth because shareholders can sue if they believe the board of directors is not 
pursuing the entity’s social purpose.54 This would not be a viable claim under Chinese corporate 
law.55 
Still, the Chinese corporations’ contractual approach and the modern social enterprise 
statutes share an important similarity in enforcement. While modern social enterprise statutes 
have a vision beyond profit maximization for shareholders, they do not provide any enforcement 
                                                          
52 To date, China has not adopted any modern social enterprise law. Though it has been argued that China 
has the ‘social welfare enterprise’ (shehui fuli qiye) as a form of social enterprise, the social welfare enterprise is not 
a modern business corporation and has a historical root in the 1950s. The purpose of the social welfare enterprise is 
legally defined, i.e., to provide disabled people with employment. The social welfare enterprise is not a corporation 
and it does not have governance features anywhere comparable to the so-called ‘benefit corporation’ in the US, the 
community contribution company in Canada, or the community interest company in the UK.   
53 BC Business Corporations Act, [SBC 2002] Chapter 57, Part 2.2; UK Companies (Audit, Investigations 
and Community Enterprise) Act 2004 and the Community Interest Company Regulations 2005. 
54 This legal proceeding is often called the ‘benefit enforcement proceeding’. 
55 See (n 48). In addition, the most relevant Chinese court decision is a case concerning the enforcement of 
the CSR provision (Article 5) in the corporate statute. In the case of Dai Ping v. Tangde Electronic (China) Co., Ltd. 
(Guangdong Huizhou Municipal Intermediate Peoples’ Court, Jun. 21, 2011) (China Judgements Online), the court 
opinion suggests that CSR is not a duty owed to any particular stakeholder such as an employee but a duty owed to 
overall stakeholders. An individual stakeholder such as an employee cannot make a claim based on the CSR 
provision. For detailed discussion, see Li-Wen Lin, ‘Mandatory Corporate Social Responsibility? Legislative 
Innovation and Judicial Application in China’ (forthcoming) American Journal of Comparative Law. 
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rights to those other than shareholders. Some social enterprise statutes in the United States even 
expressly disclaim that directors owe any fiduciary duties to various stakeholder beneficiaries 
named in the purpose statement.56 Likewise, the sample Chinese corporate charters do not 
provide any enforcement rights to various named non-shareholder beneficiaries. As the articles 
of incorporation are approved by shareholders rather than non-shareholder stakeholders, the 
contract (i.e., the articles of incorporation) is between the corporation and its shareholders. Non-
shareholder stakeholders may argue that they are intended third-party beneficiaries if the purpose 
clause expressly protects their interests. Under the contractual approach, the corporation may 
adopt a defensive strategy by including a ‘no non-shareholder beneficiary clause’ in the charter 
to prevent non-contracting parties from making any intended third-party beneficiary claim.57 
Without credible enforcement by those affected by the proclaimed corporate purpose, the special 
incorporation of a social enterprise is more of a high-profiled marketing strategy whereas a 
stakeholder-oriented purpose clause in a regular business organization’s charter is no more than a 
low-profiled branding device. 
 
6. Conclusion 
As a theoretical matter, corporate purpose seems a fundamental issue of corporate law. 
However, as a matter of practice, the corporate purpose articulated in the articles of incorporation 
                                                          
56 Both Colorado and Delaware benefit corporation laws deny that directors owe any duty to a beneficiary 
of the public benefit purpose because of that person’s status as a beneficiary. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §7-101-
506(2)(a); DEL. CODE ANN. Tit. 8, § 365(b). For more detailed analysis, see Joan MacLeod Hemingway, 
‘Corporate Purpose and Litigation Risk in Publicly Held U.S. Benefit Corporations’ (2017) 40 Seattle University 
Law Review 611, 622-625.  
57 Existing CSR literature has shown that some corporations have adopted a “no-third-party-beneficiary” 
clause in supply contracts that incorporate labor and environmental standards. The purpose of the clause is to 
prevent workers and others who appear to be protected by the labor and environmental standards in the contract 
from making a third-party beneficiary claim. See Li-Wen Lin, ‘Legal Transplants through Private Contracting: 
Codes of Vendor Conduct in Global Supply Chains as an Example’ (2009) 57 American Journal of Comparative 
Law 711, 743.  
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seems largely irrelevant. The Chinese experience suggests that the lack of legal importance of 
the corporate purpose clause stated in the articles of incorporation is attributable to the 
institutional constraints and the intrinsic nature of the corporate purpose. The Chinese experience 
also shows that the formulation of corporate purpose is influenced by a set of organizational, 
sectorial, regional, societal and national conditions and it may evolve over time. Given changing 
demands, there is probably no fixed, one-size-fits-all purpose for all corporations around the 
world.     
 
  
           
 
   
